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1 Introduction
Social organizations, the alternative of Non-Governmental organizations 
(NGos) and a form of social movements, in the People’s republic of China 
have often been considered weak or ineffective under the Communist Party of 
China’s (CPC) authoritarian rule (Hildebrandt, 2013). This conclusion is not hard 
to reach given the 1989 Tian’anmen Incident where collective actions calling for 
democratization ended in bloodshed after the CPC authorities’ intervention. 
The term Minyun [民运] refers to grassroots collective actions and movements, 
including pro-democracy movements (Minzhu Yundong [民主运动]) and civil 
movements (Minjian Yundong [民间运动]). The Tian’anmen Incident marked a 
turning point in the development of social movements in mainland China. The 
Minyun actors have since then been defined by the authorities as potential anti-
Communist actors. Thereafter, social organizations were stripped of autonomy 
through the implementation of a restrictive registration system which requires 
all social organizations to register under official institutions of the CPC — in 
other words, to expose themselves under total surveillance.
 However, scholars like Li yanyan (2012) have disputed the depiction of Chinese 
social organizations being ineffective in affecting the official, claiming that even 
under the oppressive Chinese government, social organizations can still gain 
political space and even official support through strategic cooperation with the 
government.
Chinese social organizations are indeed heading into an era of proliferation 
after 2011. As mentioned above, Chinese social organizations are required to 
complete civil registration in the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) for legitimacy 
and access to resources. According to MCA, the number of registered social 
organizations doubled in 2011, from approximately 450,000 to 700,000 (The 
Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2010–2016). This change was promoted and backed by 
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the proposal of a new governing strategy: Social Governance [社会治理] which 
proposes to decentralize the government’s power. Specifically, “activating 
social organizations” was defined in the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th CPC 
Central Committee—where issues regarding Social Governance reform were 
discussed—as one of the central targets of the reform (Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party, 2013a). For Chinese social organizations, this proposal 
eased the hurdle of legal registration, improving access to official resources, and 
welcoming them into the political institution led by the CPC.
Nevertheless, not all social organizations benefit from this change. In 2014, a 
lesbian and gay organization named Hunan With Love [湖南同爱网络协作机
制] submitted its application for civil registration to the local MCA office. After 
15 days, the organization was replied that “…Social organizations should not 
violate widely-shared moral ethics. Since homosexuality contradicts traditional 
culture, socialist culture and the ethics of our country, the application is denied.1” 
The public and official attitude toward non-normative sexualities has changed 
from the late 1970s (the Economic reform), especially after 1989.2 Tong-xing-
lian [同性恋], meaning homosexuality, has grown to be the most visible among 
all non-normative sexualities in China after late ’70s. Li yinhe, one of the first 
batch of mainland Chinese sociologists who devoted in the study of sexuality, 
conducted a research on discourses regarding sexuality posted on The People’s 
Daily [人民日报]– the CPC’s official newspaper for ideological propaganda 
– from 1949 to 2014. She argues that discourses regarding non-normative 
sexualities—mostly gay and lesbian—have changed from being utilized as 
instrument for ideological propaganda against the “West” to the indicator of 
human rights protection (Li, 2014).
Gender and sexuality social movements have also seen proliferation within the 
same era. The term Tongzhi [同志], meaning “comrade”, was a term of address 
used by the Party members to refer to respected individuals, has since been 
re-appropriated, referring to those who do not identify as heterosexual. Such 
re-appropriation was firstly seen in a batch of overseas Hong Kong students who 
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identified themselves as non-heterosexual in the US in the 1970s; they chose 
the term Tongzhi to distance themselves both from the US lesbian and gay 
movement and from mainstream Hong Kong society where anything from China 
was considered backward (Qi, 2013). The ’89 Hong Kong Lesbian and Gay Film 
Festival firstly brought this appropriation to mainland China. This term, which 
referred to lesbian and gays in the 1990s, has been widened to include bisexual, 
transgender and other non-normative sexualities, with the proliferation of LGBT 
politics and queer activism on a global scale after the late 2000s (Guo, in press). 
In this paper, I use the term Tongzhi to refer to Chinese LGBTQ identities. 
The legitimacy enjoyed by Tongzhi organizations lasted only during their 
co-operation with the government on the AIDs issues (Hildebrandt, 2013). At 
present, they are continually denied civil registration for being contradictory to 
widely-shared moral ethics. Susan Mann (2011=2015) traced the history of China 
from the lens of gender and sexuality, argued that although significant changes 
of sexual moral values had been seen especially after the May Fourth movement, 
the oppressive traditional values have been constantly reiterated to exclude 
non-normative sexualities, as well as limiting women’s agency. Communist 
Party-led China was founded on an ideological basis seeking to liberalize the 
poor and to challenge the feudalistic capitalistic structure. However, despite the 
official attitude toward the alleged traditional feudal values and their explicit 
criticism of such, the same values are appropriated, and cited in the Party’s favor 
to exclude non-normative sexualities in the name of maintaining social stability.
In fact, China has put in place strong management over sexuality since 
1949. The “one child policy” is one of the most illustrative. It explicitly opposes 
reproductive rights and sexual self-determination. Therefore, it is obvious that 
the Chinese government’s exclusion of Tongzhi organizations derives from the 
destructive potential of Tongzhi to contest pervasive heteronormativity which 
sustains the status quo. However, such a conclusion does not provide a sufficient 
picture on the extent of exclusion faced by Tongzhi organizations.
Therefore, how can Tongzhi activism be located within China’s history of social 
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movements, where Minyun (both pro-democracy and civil) movements have 
been dealt with cautiously? How are Tongzhi organizations excluded from the 
institution of Social Governance by the discourses of “(traditional) moral ethics?”
Methodology
To answer these questions, I firstly analyze governmental documents—laws, 
regulations, administrative guidelines and notices—regarding registration 
of social organizations to shed light on the official attitude towards social 
organizations. Pro-democracy activists’ personal and organizational blogs 
were reviewed to clarify the strategies of the (overseas) Minyun. The articles 
are collected from China News Digest, Hua Xia Wen Zhai [华夏文摘] and the 
Independent review where (overseas) Minyun activists have been the most 
involved.
regarding Tongzhi activism, I conducted fieldwork and 20 semi-structural 
interviews. As for the fieldwork, I chose the first and one of the biggest 
Tongzhi community centers in China: the Beijing LGBT Center [北京同志中
心]. The fieldwork lasted a total of two months in March and September 2016 
respectively. Access to the field was provided by the current Center Director who 
preferred to be addressed by her pseudonym Xiao Tie [小铁]. Data collected 
during fieldwork included photographs, field notes and recordings of meetings 
conducted and disclosed under the consent of my informants. Interviews were 
conducted with all five of the core staff of the Center, four out of five founders 
of the Center, five volunteers who frequently participated in the events of the 
Center during my fieldwork out of 300, and six activists who were introduced by 
Xiao Tie. All interviews were conducted in Mandarin. The citations used in this 
paper have been translated to English by the author.
In the first section, I analyze the CPC’s regulations on social organizations and 
the discourse of Social Governance. In the second section, I trace the origin of 
the CPC’s focus on patriotism by reviewing the relationship between Minyun 
(pro-democracy and civil movement) and CPC power. Section 3 brings Tongzhi 
activism into the binary opposition of Minyun versus the State. In section 4, I 
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dive into local Tongzhi activist sites, investigating their activist strategies within 
the frameworks of “moral ethics” discourse and the binary opposition between 
Minyun and the State, following which I conclude in section 5.
2 Patriotism as Moral Ethics
This section attempts to define the institutional ground on which the 
discourse of “moral ethics” is based. I argue that the moral ethics CPC adopts 
in social organizations governance may also imply the preservation of the State 
power.
In the 18th National People’s Congress (NPC) meeting held in 2012, CPC 
authorities proposed Social Governance which was described by CPC academics 
as “the most significant policy shift after the launch of the Economic reform” 
(Xie, 2016; Wang, 2014). For the implementation of Social Governance, the 
meeting proposed a combined strategy of Fazhi [法治] (Law Governance) and 
Dezhi [德治] (Moral Governance).3 Fazhi strengthens and promotes a series of 
judicial system reforms, including a change of regulations to lower the barriers to 
civil registration faced by social organizations. In the proposal of Dezhi, the CPC 
announced a number of values to which the modern Chinese citizens should 
conform. These values were named “the Socialist Core Values.” They are:
To be rich and powerful, to be democratic, to be civilized, to stay 
peaceful with others; to advocate freedom, equality, justice and the rule 
of law; to be patriotic, to be dedicated to one’s own career, to be honest, 
and to be friendly. (Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 
2013b)
The values can be roughly sorted into two categories: a) values that require 
people to use economic benefits properly; and b) values that require people 
to submit to the CPC’s authority and continued rule. Although no reference 
to traditional culture or family structure is mentioned in these values, the 
references to “socialist culture” and “ethics of our country” such as “to advocate 
freedom, equality, justice and the rule of law” and “Patriotism” were emphasized. 
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In the Regulations on Registration Administration of Social Organizations 
enacted in 1989, the same year when Tian’anmen Incident took place, the State 
Council clearly stated the standards guiding official registration and refusal 
thereof:
Article 4. Social organizations shall abide by the  Constitution, 
laws, regulations and policies of the State … may not endanger the 
reunification and security of the country or the unity of the nationalities 
… and may not breach social ethics and morality. (The State Council, 
1989)
“Social ethics and morality” is juxtaposed with patriotism in the above article 
that hasn’t been changed after two amendments in 1998 and 2016 respectively. 
According to the CPC, the State refers not only to the nation, but also the 
leadership of the CPC. Zhao Ziyang [赵紫阳], the CPC Chairman from 1981 to 
1989, advocated in the 13th NPC meeting held in 1987 that the whole party and 
the State should stay firmly with the principles of “one central task and two basic 
points [一个中心，两个基本点]” which centers around the principle to firmly 
pledge allegiance to the leadership of the CPC (Deng, 1979, March 30). In the 15th 
NPC meeting held in 1997, the principle was elevated as the foundation of the 
State. Clearly, the CPC intends to blur the boundary between the State and the 
Party, creating a State-Party ruling continuum. In this sense, the socialist moral 
ethics which center around the value of Patriotism, both to the State and the 
Party, were invented in the power’s favor to maintain the status quo (Hobsbawm, 
1983).4
Therefore, it is possible that the denial of registration in the name of moral 
ethics may indicate not only the social organization’s non-conformity with the 
re-vitalized traditional values, but also because it goes against the State’s views 
on patriotism. In other words, the CPC’s fear of replacement is the specter that 
lurks behind denials of social organizations after 1989. How, then, are social 
organizations linked to the possibility of demolishing the State/Party? 
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3 The Moral War
This section traces the origin of the tension between the CPC authorities and 
social organizations, analyzing how the discourse of “moral ethics” was adopted 
by pro-democracy activists in their criticism against the CPC, and how same 
discourse has been used by the authorities.  
The CPC’s cautious attitude toward social organizations can be traced 
back to the eruption of Minyun in 1989. The chaotic Cultural revolution was 
officially ended after the launch of Economic reform in 1978.5 It marshaled 
the combination of the socialist political institution and neoliberal capitalist 
market economy, leading to the emergence of a new social class of “bureau-
preneurs”—a term which refers to bureaucrats who gain economic benefits 
by controlling local, state-hold entrepreneurs (Lü, 2000). The accumulation 
of economic and political power into a specific social class caused serious 
problems of corruption and widespread criticism from society. The CPC’s 
attitude toward such criticism during the earlier stages of Economic reform 
was neutral. For example, The Minyun in 1979 actually gathered and united 
various social actors under the flag of Democracy, Freedom and Human rights, 
inspiring the establishment of the Democracy Wall—where people can post any 
criticism of the governors and institution—in Beijing with the CPC’s approval.6 
However, as the corruption within the CPC worsened, criticisms became acute, 
then developed into street demonstrations, and finally ended with the bloody 
oppression known as the ‘89 Tian’anmen Incident (Zhao, 2011). The activists and 
key persons of the ‘79 and ‘89 Minyun were either put into prison for “inciting 
subversion of the State” or expelled from the mainland.7
Nevertheless, the government’s wiping out of Minyun energy didn’t stop 
criticism of the CPC’s one-party rule. Those Minyun activists who escaped 
China connected with foreign media and forged a new wave of Minyun known 
amongst activists as overseas Minyun.8 one of the strategies of overseas Minyun 
is founding opposing parties outside of mainland China. For example, the China 
Democratic Party founded in the US in 1998, and the China Social Democratic 
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Party founded in the US in 2007. 
Another more widely adopted strategy is to take up the discourse of “moral 
ethics”—in the purpose of inciting the public—in criticisms against the CPC. 
After the 2000s, with the deepening of Economic reform and the accumulation 
of power, local giant companies—usually backed by local governments—were 
exposed violating moral ethics and human rights. For example, the tainted milk 
scandal in 2008; and the school unlawful charges disclosed after the 2010s. Such 
problems are regarded and defined as “moral depravity” by Minyun activists.9 
China News Digest (CND), founded on 8th March 1989 in the US, was a mailing 
system run by four Chinese overseas science students in the US and Canada 
which later evolved into a web magazine named Hua Xia Wen Zhai [华夏文
摘] (HXWZ) in 1991.10 on 27th July 2011, HXWZ posted an article named “The 
Communist Party of China Should be Fully responsible for the Moral Depravity 
in Chinese Society.” Mei Li, the author of the article, wrote as following:
The moral depravity should first be attributed to the bureaucrats and 
their corrupting behaviors. In China, one of the most popular saying is “no 
bureaucrat is not corrupted.” The trading of job positions in government 
for money has become almost a tacit rule … (Mei, 2011, July 27)11
Similar arguments can be found in articles posted by opposing parties. Liu 
Guokai [刘国凯], the founder of the Chinese Social Democratic Party and a 
veteran Minyun activist who was defined as anti-revolutionary in 1977, and was 
interrogated for joining the 1979 Guangzhou Minyun, wrote as follows:
The corruption of CPC bureaucrats has affected the whole Chinese 
society and resulted in a grim fact of moral depravity. How does the CPC 
regard such a situation? First, there is a little the CPC can do to change 
the situation since this is what the CPC itself has created. As the CPC is the 
root of moral depravity in society, how can the people trust such party to 
change the situation? Second, some of the CPC figures might even want 
to stay with the situation, because if the whole society was corrupted, the 
CPC’s corruption would not stand out. If the whole nation is busy chasing 
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money and economic benefits, the people would forget about social 
justice and philanthropy, and thus commit to the political system the CPC 
has created, which is what the CPC planned for. (Liu, n.d.)12
Liu emphasized on “chasing money and economic benefits”. In this sense, he 
links moral depravity with blindly pursuing economic benefits, especially for 
bureaucrats. He expressed worry that such behaviors may lower the importance 
of social justice and philanthropy. In other words, Liu tries to say that as 
bureaucrats, CPC officials should concentrate on social justice and philanthropy 
instead of economic gain. 
However, both discourses of social justice and philanthropy appear to be 
aphasiac facing CPC’s launch of Social Governance and the focus on Dezhi 
(Moral Governance). After Xi Jinping [习近平] was elected chairman of the CPC 
in 2012, a series of anti-corruption campaigns were launched. According to Zhu 
(2016), these campaigns call on the public to disclose CPC bureaucrats’ corrupt 
behaviors. By severely punishing the involved bureaucrats, the CPC showcases 
its legitimacy as the morally correct ruler, and proves to the public that it is the 
guarantor of social justice and philanthropy.
Although it is hard to prove that the CPC’s launching of Dezhi is a response 
to the overseas Minyun’s criticism, the fact that the CPC strengthened its own 
anti-corruption campaign after 2010s render critiques based on the discourse of 
“social justice” and “philanthropy” powerless. A structure of “Moral War” where 
actors involved adopt the discourses of “moral ethics” in disputes over political 
legitimacy was then set up. 
4 Close-but-Far Relation between Minyun and Tongzhi Activism
In this section, I investigate how Tongzhi activism can be posited within 
the strucutre of Moral War between Minyun and the CPC authorities. In 
his sociological study of Chinese social organizations, Hildebrandt (2013) 
proposes that economic opportunities, political opportunities and personal 
opportunities are the three major factors affecting the relationship between 
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social organizations and the governments. In his framework, economic 
opportunities refer to the opportunities in which social organizations and 
the local governments can cooperate to gain financial resources; political 
opportunities refer to the opportunities through which the organizations and 
local governments can enjoy the security of political legitimacy and authority; 
personal opportunities refer to the opportunities through which personal 
relationships between organization leaders and local government officials may 
be crucial in gaining both the economic and political resources. Hildebrandt 
argues that these three opportunities intersect with each other, making the 
survival and viability of Chinese social organizations multilateral (ibid.). His 
focus on personal opportunities is very useful in understanding the situation of 
Chinese social organizations.
The linkage between Tongzhi activism and Minyun was forged through 
the AIDs crisis in the 1990s. on a global scale, the AIDs crisis was crucial in the 
development of gay activism, as the disease has always been associated with 
gay communities. The AIDs crisis also contributed to the high visibility of gay and 
lesbian identity, but unlike the queer solidarity formed during the AIDs crisis in 
the U.S., the AIDs crisis in China catalyzed the division between gay and lesbian 
activism. The division can be traced back to the gay organizations’ dominant 
occupation of movement resources. 
Instead of contributing to the solidarity between gay and lesbian activism, the 
AIDs crisis served as the connection between gay activism and Minyun. Before 
the first report of HIV infection in China, the virus was regarded as imported 
by CPC authorities (Li, 2014). In the 1980s, China depended on imported blood 
products, but after the discovery of the first domestic AIDs patient, the Chinese 
government decided to develop its own blood bank by promoting paid blood 
donation, which soon developed into the Plasma Economy in the 1990s (Shen, 
Liu, Han and Zhang, 2004). 
During that time, the economic gap between inland provinces and coastal 
regions was significant (Ako, 2009). The trade of plasma became a chance by 
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which inland provincial officials could showcase their governing capabilities and 
ability to inspire the local economy. However, given the lack of knowledge and 
medical support, impoverished provinces like Henan, Guangxi, Guizhou, and 
Sichuan saw villages of people infected by the virus from non-standard blood 
collection, known widely as the AIDs villages.
Minyun, and local AIDs organizations, which later developed into Tongzhi 
organizations, first joined their forces in the exposure of the Plasma Economy 
to the global society. The violation of people’s health and human rights for the 
CPC’s political survival and economic achievement provided the Minyun activists 
a chance to wage a Moral War on the CPC. Furthermore, the tragic stories of 
people in those villages, alongside their poverty-induced suffering, served as 
efficient political tools for Minyun to incite the public and global society against 
the CPC.13
Some organizations that later supported Tongzhi activism disclosed data 
and information to international media. one of the most influential AIDs 
organizations the Beijing Aizhixing Institute of Health Education (BAIHE) founded 
in 1994 is one of those organizations. Its founder Wan yanhai [万延海] is crucial 
in the connection between Minyun and Tongzhi activism. Born in 1963, Wan is 
a veteran supporter and founder of various LGBTQ events and organizations, 
including the Beijing Homosexual Film Festival [北京同性恋电影节] in 2001, 
which was later known as the Beijing Queer Film Festival [北京酷儿影展]; he also 
supported the founding of Common Language [同语] in 2005, which focuses on 
lesbian, bisexual and transgender women issues; he is also one of the founders 
of the Beijing LGBT Center.
on Semptember 4th, 2002, the Chinese-language website of Voice of America 
reported the arrest of Wan. The report says:
Wan yanhai, a Chinese AIDs activist who currently went missing, was 
confirmed alive by his friend, Hu Jia. He admitted that Wan is very likely 
to be arrested by the Department of National Security of China. He further 
calls on the global society and media to put more pressure on the Chinese 
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government for Wan’s release.
…
The non-governmental organization the Beijing Aizhixing Institute of 
Health Education Wan founded in 1994 exposed the list of HIV victims 
in Henan Province during the chaotic Plasma Economy. His effort in 
disclosing the information was respected by the United Nations and 
the global society, but at the same time attracted attention from the 
Department of National Security of China. Earlier this year, the employees 
of his organization were arrested, and the organization was investigated. 
Its official website was also shut down by the Beijing authorities last 
month.14
This report shows that the disclosure of information about the Plasma 
Economy does not only involve the opposing Minyun activists, but also foreign 
media and international organizations such as the UN, which directly affects the 
CPC’s image on the global political stage. Without the information disclosed by 
BAIHE and Wan, overseas Minyun activists would not have had a chance to join 
forces with overseas media and the UN on the issue of human rights violations 
in AIDs villages. It makes Wan widely respected by overseas Minyun activists. 
However, this respect and the linkage built also led to Wan’s escape in 2010, after 
attending the award ceremony for Liu Xiaobo’s [刘晓波] Nobel Peace Prize.15
Another case further complicates the seemingly close relationship between 
Minyun and Tongzhi activism. Another key activist that connects Minyun and 
Tongzhi activism is Li Dan [李丹] who was born in 1978. Li has also long focused 
on the issue of AIDs villages, he established an AIDs orphanage in Shangqiu, 
Henan province. Like Wan, He has also supported Chinese Tongzhi activism from 
the early 2000s, and held a public space in Beijing where several screenings of 
the Beijing Queer Film Festival took place. He received the reebok Human rights 
Award in 2006.16 As a celebration, Xu Zhiyong [许志永] wrote Li Dan a public 
letter which contains the following expressions:
… you (Li Dan) are devoted to fight against AIDs pandemic HIV/AIDs 
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prevention, but Wang Dan, as a male homosexual, keeps spreading the 
virus through his conduct of abnormal sexual behaviors among gay 
people, turning more people into victims…17 (Xu, 2006, May 26)
Xu is a Chinese civil rights activist and leading figure of the New Citizens’ 
Movement which serves as a networking system of Chinese civil movements; 
he was sentenced to four years in prison for “gathering crowds and disrupting 
public order” in 2014.18 His letter might just be an anecdote in a sense, but in 
another, it does manifest how Tongzhi issues are regarded by leading Minyun 
figures through the using of the expression such as “abnormal” and “spreading 
the virus”. As I stated, the main strategy of Minyun activists in the Moral War is 
to incite the public by accusing the CPC of violations of moral ethics. To those 
activists, in an era when Tongzhi issues were not widely accepted by the local 
Chinese public as part of human rights issues, Tongzhi discourses served poorly 
to incite moral accusations against the CPC.
 Therefore, the close-but-far relationship with Minyun has placed Tongzhi 
activism under the CPC’s surveillance that ultimately stems from its cautious 
attitude toward Minyun, despite the lack of active coalition. 
5 Moral Assimilation of Tongzhi Organizations
This section examines how the Moral War affected Tongzhi organizations. I will 
draw on the data I collected from my fieldwork in the Beijing LGBT Center and 
interviews with local Tongzhi activists.
The focus of the Tongzhi movement has changed from building connections 
with global society in the 1990s to promoting institutionalization and legislation 
after the 2010s (Guo, in press). For example, the leading Lala (lesbian, bisexual 
and transgender women) organization Common Language participated in the 
legislation of the Anti-Domestic Violence Law (2016), and successfully expanded 
the law to cover “people who live together”. 19 The Beijing LGBT Center has also 
supported a lawsuit against psychological counseling center that advertised gay 
conversion therapy. on 19 December 2014, the People’s Court of Haidian District 
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in Beijing gave a judgement. The verdict states that:
… since homosexuality is not considered a mental disorder, the 
advertisement and promise made by Chengdu Xinyu Piaoxiang 
Psychological Consultation Center is fraudulent.” (Common Language, 
2015, p.15)
It was marked the first direct official response on the issue of homosexuality. 
After the court session, to show their respect and appreciation, activists gifted 
the People’s Court a statue of justice.20 This gift intends to convince local officials 
that Tongzhi organizations and communities appreciated the government’s 
righteous judgment, and confirms the local People’s Court as the protector of 
the rule of law.
While the gifting may unintentionally confirm the CPC’s legitimacy as the 
correct ruler, the strategy must be understood within the local Chinese context 
where a strong government significantly limits the autonomy and strategies of 
social organizations. on March 20th, 2016, while working in the Beijing LGBT 
Center, I received a phone call looking for the Center Director; Xiao Tie, the 
director, told me it had been an investigator from the Department of National 
Security who wanted to speak with her while refusing to enter the office.21 Such 
intervention is constant, especially when the Center is involved in events backed 
by the UN or foreign embassies.22 Therefore, it is necessary to evade all forms 
of overseas intervention in front of the government for Tongzhi organizations 
to maintain political safety. However, re-confirming the CPC as the only 
legitimate ruler by adhering to the value of Patriotism may risk placing Tongzhi 
organizations as followers and advocators of the CPC regime, thus strengthening 
and rationalizing the oppressive structure.
Furthermore, the widening distance between Tongzhi activism and Minyun 
also contributes to the assimilationist strategy. This is manifested through the 
personal relationships between current and former leaders. For example, the 
current leader who has started working in the Center since 2013 stated that she 
only well knew the former director with whom she has actually worked with; 
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as for other former leaders since the center’s establishment in 2008, she barely 
knew them in person; even about one of the founders Wan yanhai, she has only 
heard of the name.23
However, “moral assimilation” is indeed confronted by activists. There are 
severe disputes over Tongzhi organizations’ moral assimilation, but the disputes 
remain in the domain of traditional culture and family values. The Parents and 
Friends of Lesbians And Gays China [中国同性恋亲友会] (PFLAG China) is at 
the forefront of this dispute. PFLAG China is an organization founded in 2008. 
It aims at advocating the friends and families of Tongzhi to create a friendly 
environment in society.24 one of the founders, Wu youjian [吴幼坚], is the first 
mother who openly supported her gay son in public, which stirred heated 
debate and largely raised the visibility of gays and lesbians since 2005. Wei Wei 
(2015), a sociologist who attempted to map queer cultures from the perspectives 
of urban spaces, popular culture, and social policies in modern China, argues 
that: 
PFLAG China’s strategy accurately grasped the changing trend 
of modern Chinese family structures. Through recognizing and 
accepting their children’s sexual orientation, parents in PFLAG reacted 
to the challenge Chinese families face in this changing trend. To some 
extent, the problems PFLAG China tries to solve are not only about 
homosexuality, but also general problems faced by Chinese families 
during rapid changes, which contributes to PFLAG China’s widely spread 
reverberation in the society. (Wei, 2015, p.176)
It is necessary to admit that PFLAG China does contribute and bring up acute 
issues of family values, but their strategies are still questioned. Guo yujie [郭玉
洁], the legal representative of the Beijing LGBT Center wrote in her review of 
Fan Popo’s film Rainbow Mama — a film that documented six mothers with 
homosexual children with the cooperation of PFLAG China — that:
The simple motivation for mamas to participate in the activism is 
that “you can’t criticize my child, my child is homosexual, so you can’t 
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criticize homosexuality either.” Such maternal love is indeed great, but 
it helps little in the demolishing of gender/sexuality hegemonies, family 
structures, and the establishment of free and equal relationships. (Guo, 
2013, october 3)
In response to Guo’s criticism, the leader of PFLAG China, A Qiang [阿强] 
posted an article titled “Why is it Too Bad for Parents to Love their Children?” on 
his personal blog, accusing Guo being too distant from activist reality.25
Numerous factors have contributed to the situation of Tongzhi activism after 
the 2010s. Interpretations of “moral ethics” being merely cultural, and the history 
of Minyun both contribute to the culture of de-politicization of Tongzhi activism, 
which Wei (2015) defined as organizations avoiding direct confrontation with 
power. Although it is necessary to question traditional culture and values that 
are discriminatory against Tongzhi, to gain political space by adhering to the 
value of Patriotism underwrites and strengthens the oppressive and exclusive 
institution.
6 Conclusion
This paper focuses on the CPC’s institutional exclusion against Tongzhi 
organizations by utilizing the discourses of “moral ethics”. First, I argue that 
the discourses of “moral ethics” is twofold—referring to not only traditional 
culture but also Patriotism—through analyzing official documents. Second, 
the concentration on Patriotism derives from the tension between the CPC and 
Minyun, with whom Tongzhi organizations historically built a complex, close-
but-far relationship; this, in turn, provided further basis for the institutional 
exclusion against Tongzhi besides traditional values. Third, I traced the 
debate over “moral depravity” between the CPC and Minyun activists, naming 
this debate a “Moral War”. Within this Moral War, on the one hand, Tongzhi 
organizations are regarded as the accomplice of Minyun by the authorities; on 
the other, they are regarded as non-helpful issues in waging the Moral War by 
Minyun activists, which led to the Tongzhi organizations’ dominant focus on 
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institutional survival and traditional cultures—a focus which further strengthens 
the CPC’s oppressive institution by adhering to the value of Patriotism.
Therefore, under Chinese authoritarian government, though strategic 
conformity to the political institution brings activist issues into public discussion, 
it also contributes to the maintenance of the authoritarian power. He (2016), 
a Taiwanese scholar and activist who conducted extensive investigative 
research of Taiwanese Tongzhi activism’s trend toward legislation, argues that 
a predominant focus on legislation may extend state surveillance and control. 
Although during the process of institutionalization, activists and organizations 
are still in doubt regarding the political institution, the culture of depoliticization 
(Wei, 2015) conceals such criticism against CPC’s oppressive institution. 
Unlike the queer solidarity formed during the AIDs crisis during the ‘80s in 
the U.S., similar crises in China catalyzed the division between local gay and 
lesbian activism through the unequal distribution of movement resources 
(Toyama, 2015; Guo, in press). However, the Chinese AIDs crisis promoted links 
between local gay activism and Minyun, which resulted further in a cautionary 
attitude by the government toward Tongzhi activism. Studies conducted on 
Chinese Tongzhi activism such as Hildebrandt (2013) and Engbresten (2015) 
take the opposition between Tongzhi organizations and the government for 
granted, depicting the government and its authoritarian rule as the ultimate 
enemy of Tongzhi activism. Such arguments sustain dichotomies of oppressive 
government and subversive social organizations, which may further rationalize 
the CPC authorities’ oppression on social organizations to remove possible 
contestation and protests against their legitimacy. Therefore, this paper calls for 
careful investigations on activism under an authoritarian state.
Furthermore, as mentioned in the introduction of this paper, the launch of 
Social Governance proposed a twofold governing strategy—the combination 
of law governance and moral governance. Since there is a lack of independent 
judicial system in China, to examine law governance and moral governance 
separately may not be sufficient. However, Tongzhi organizations face a 
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paradoxical situation where law governance grants them social participation in 
institutions, yet moral governance defines them as potential moral dangers. The 
ultimate focus of this paper is on the discourse of “moral ethics”. However, how 
the discourse of moral ethics work in tandem with the discourse of “modernizing 
the judicial system” which gradually eliminates trans/homophobic articles and 
expressions in governmental documents still needs further examination. 
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道徳をめぐる抗争 ― 中国における「道徳ガバナンス」と同志運動
郭立夫
2012 年、中国政府はソーシャル・ガバナンスを打ち出した。中国の市民団
体は法令に基づき民政局への登録が求められるが、ソーシャル・ガバナンス体
制下で、市民団体の登録基準は緩和され、民政局に認可を受けた市民団体の数
は急増している。だが、こうした規制緩和の流れに反するように、同志
（LGBT）団体は「道徳規準に適さない」ことを理由に民政登録を拒否される事
例が相次いでいる。
同志団体をソーシャル・ガバナンスから排除する際に政府機関が用いてきた
「道徳」とは、いったい何を指すのか。そして同志団体は「道徳」言説に対し
ていかなる生存戦略を採用してきたのか。本稿では「同志」との関連で用いら
れる「道徳」をめぐる公的言説に着目し、その背景に隠されたイデオロギーや
同志団体の対抗戦略を分析し、次の点を明らかにした。
まず、中国政府は「中国社会の伝統」である「道徳」がモノガミーな異性婚
制度に依拠している点を強調して「同性愛」と矛盾する点を述べてきたが、そ
のような「道徳」言説は実は新中国の成立（1949）後に構築されたものにす
ぎなかった。また、2012 年以降、「愛国／愛（共産）党」が市民の遵守すべき
基本「道徳」のひとつとみなされるようになり、その結果、89 年以来の民主
運動と人的な繋がりを持った同志運動は民政部への登録から排除されてきたの
ではないかと指摘した。民主運動は 1990 年代以降も海外へ拠点を移して共産
党政権との間で「道徳」をめぐる抗争を続けており、同志運動はその狭間で困
難な政治状況に置かれたのである。そのような厳しい政治状況の中、同志運動
は生存戦略としてみずからが「道徳的」であることをしばしば強調するような
同化戦略を用いており、その結果、共産党の覇権体制や排外的なソーシャル・
ガバナンスをはからずも強化していると論じた。
Keywords:
中国、社会運動、同志・LGBT、道徳、 ソーシャル・ガバナンス
